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Abstract
At present, the world-economy is exceedingly fragile. Debt levels of nations
peak. Monetary assets increase, too, and concentrate in the hands of few. In this
paper, I show that a mechanism at the root of today's monetary system entails an
inherently fragile economy. I simulate the consequences of this mechanism within
a macroeconomic model. I motivate a new monetary system that gives money
the role it should have: to facilitate complex interactions in a stable environment.
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1 Introduction
At present, we face severe economic problems. Debt volumes peak and are less and less
tolerated. At the same time, monetary assets are at historic highs and concentrate in
the hands of few. Central banking has become less eective. For example in the euro
area before the nancial crisis, the European Central Bank (ECB) could stimulate
the economy by lowering interest rates. Lower interest rates led to stronger bank
lending, to more money in the hands of non-banks and to higher aggregate spending.
At the moment, although central bank rates are at the zero-lower-bound, lending is
weak. Banks have become reluctant to grant risky loans, and borrowers' demand for
loans has weakened. Economic growth is expected to remain weak and the economic
environment is considered as fragile.
This paper reveals that many of today's problems or the view that something is
problematic result from one mechanism at the root of today's monetary system. The
fault is that money can only be created simultaneously with interest bearing debt.
According to the denition of the monetary aggregate M1, money consists of coins,
bank notes and deposits in the hands of non-banks. In the euro area, national govern-
ments still mint coins. Central banks print bank notes and commercial banks create
deposits. In the euro zone, more than 80 percent of money in circulation are deposits.
Put dierently, commercial banks create more than 80 percent of money in circulation.
Today's money creation process is in fact a money-and-debt creation process. When
granting a loan to a non-bank, the bank charges an amount of debt D to this non-
bank. At the same time, it adds the same amount M = D to the current account of
the non-bank. Deposits, which are money M by denition and practice, have been
created.
In the euro zone, the bank is required to apply a minimum reserve ratio rr to deposits.
For the newly created moneyM , it has to hold rr M as required reserves at the ECB.
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The bank informs the ECB about its need of new central bank liquidity rr M . Due to
the benchmark allotment concept,1 the ECB increases the allotment of central bank
liquidity in its renancing operations by rr M . The bank borrows rr M from the
ECB. In its balance sheet, minimum reserve holdings at the ECB and renancing
volume from the ECB both increase, see Table 1. Evidently, the rst impulse for
money creation is the transaction between the private bank and the non-bank. The
ECB follows and adjusts the amount of central bank liquidity.
Table 1: Money creation by commercial banks
Assets Bank Liabilities
Debt of non-bank +D Deposits of non-bank +M
Minimum reserves +rr M Renancing volume +rr M
Today's banks are active in nancial intermediation and money creation. Financial
intermediation implies that a bank rst receives money saved by a non-bank and then
lends this saved money to another non-bank. In the above described money-and-debt
creation process, the bank does not need any savings. The bank creates money and
debt simultaneously out of nothing. Benes and Kumhof (2012) emphasize that the
traditionally assumed money multiplier process does not exist and that banks create
loans and money on their own initiative, in interaction with loan or rather money
demand. The central bank follows in the provision of central bank liquidity.
Note that the transmission process of monetary policy only works if banks actually
create loans and money simultaneously. According to the interest rate channel, lower
1Traditionally, the ECB applies a benchmark allotment concept to the allotment of central bank
liquidity to commercial banks. It implies that the ECB adjusts its allotment in tender operations
to cover the minimum reserves needs of banks plus their net decit from autonomous factors. With
the introduction of xed rate full allotment procedure in the nancial crisis, the ECB allots every
amount of liquidity private banks demand. For the calculation of the ECB-benchmark allotment, see
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/liq/html/index.en.html.
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interest rates stimulate demand for loans. The banks grant the loans, and money
holdings of non-banks increase. If banks were only nancial intermediaries, banks
could not meet the higher demand for loans because the lower interest rate would
make savings less attractive. Consequently, savings would rather decrease, and loans
and money holdings could not expand.
In Table 1, it is familiar to us that borrowing is a means to get money. Regarded
from the other side of the balance sheet, the only way to create money is to run into
debt. Money creation entails immediate indebtedness and the obligation to pay back
the principal plus interest.2
In the aggregate economy, the amount of money in the hands of non-banks equals the
amount of debt of non-banks with banks. An economy that wants to introduce money,
has to run into debt in equal size to the initial amount of money needed. Money will
always be necessary in an economy and therefore the principal of the debt, which
equals the initial amount of money, will never be paid back. Worse, each period,
interest on the initial debt has to be paid. In the aggregate, this money is not yet
created. To make interest rate payments in the aggregate, money has to be created
by borrowing again. New debt entails more repayment obligations in the future.
One initial amount of debt to create an initial amount of money, leads to endlessly
accumulating debt because of the obligation to make interest rate payments. If not
enough money is created to make the necessary payments, debt defaults occur. Periods
with stagnating loan volumes go along with numerous defaults of non-banks, caused
by the debt dynamics of the initial money creation.
In addition, the current monetary system produces high economic inequalities. The
wealth gap between lenders, .e. banks or their owners, and borrowers, i.e. non-banks,
widens during time. The wealth of bankers grows during time because of accumulated
2The same principle holds for the interactions between the ECB and commercial banks, because
the central bank money is nanced through renancing operations, which have the character of a
secured loan.
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seigniorage prots, while non-banks get more and more indebted. Note that the
shareholder or owner of a bank can receive seigniorage prots, while the bank itself is
assessed as risky due to risky assets in its balance sheet.
An incomplete perception of the debt-money system implies the illusion that debt can
be repaid if the economy grows suciently. It induces an assumed coercion to grow.
Still, economic growth does not help to pay back debt. To repay in Euro denominated
debt, the amount of Euro has to be available in the aggregate. Even if an economy
grows in real terms, i.e. the number of goods grows, this does not automatically imply
that the amount of money grows.3 The amount of money only grows through the
above described money-and-debt creation spiral. Another argument often raised for
growth says that redistribution is easier if there are more goods. In today's monetary
system the wealth gap between lenders and borrowers widens due to the accumulated
interest rates the former claim and the latter have to pay. There will be less need for
redistribution and thus growth if we are able to implement a new monetary system
that fosters equality. Then, the economy will be free to grow.
Economic research so far does not model the mechanism of debt-money in its full
consequences. Macroeconomic models usually assume that money is given to the
economy. Monetary policy of the central bank is traditionally captured by an interest
rate rule. Eects from monetary policy on the economy take place in an environment
of sticky prices. Since the nancial crisis, up-to-date DSGE models have put more
emphasis on unconventional monetary policy, the central bank balance sheet, and on
frictions in nancial markets.
In this paper, I introduce debt-and-money creation by banks to a model by Kiy-
otaki and Moore (2012) and show its long-run consequences on the evolution of debt,
money, the distribution of wealth, and the stability of the economy. The Kiyotaki-
Moore model is particularly suited for my analysis. First, the authors motivate an
3See also Keynes (1936) on the return on wheat in distinction to money.
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intrinsic need for money resulting from liquidity and nancing frictions. Second, their
model exhibits exible prices which are appropriate for my long-run perspective on the
consequences of debt-money for an economy. Finally, the Kiyotaki-Moore model al-
ready contains the idea of pure money. Pure money fulls the functions money should
have: to lubricate the economy and foster a stable environment. The Kiyotaki-Moore
model represents an economy with pure money, which I will compare to a debt-money
economy.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 recapitulates the Kiyotaki-Moore model,
Section 3 introduces debt-money to the model and illustrates its implications. It
further draws a parallel to the history of modern banking and money creation. Section
4 elaborates on the idea of pure money. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Kiyotaki-Moore model (2012)
Kiyotaki and Moore (2012) characterize their model as a liquidity-oriented interpre-
tation of Keynes' IS-LM model, which they augment by fully exible prices and wages
as well as maximizing agents. Frictions in nancial markets create scope for money
to eciently allocate resources in an innite-horizon, discrete-time economy.
Besides a non-durable good and labor, the nancial assets equity and money are
traded. If equity is fully liquid and entrepreneurs can issue as much equity as they
need for nancing an investment project, money is superuous. If equity trade and
issuance are restricted, entrepreneurs prot from money as a perfectly liquid asset.
They demand money to be liquid for future investment opportunities, and spend the
money as soon as they can undertake an investment. The availability of money as fully
liquid asset increases aggregate investment and thus output compared to a situation
without a fully liquid asset. The authors dene the economy with such an essential
role for at money as a monetary economy.
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Money itself has no a priori intrinsic value. It indirectly creates value in the Kiyotaki-
Moore model, if investors are liquidity and nancing constrained. Then money chan-
nels goods used for investment, and higher capital leads to higher output. Thus,
money indirectly adds real values to the economy. The price of money becomes posi-
tive, reecting its value added.
Frictions in equity markets reect a lack of commitment of the issuer and a lack of
trust of the buyer. The potential buyer of the share wants to check the credibility
of the issuer. Kiyotaki and Moore model this lack of liquidity as a restriction on the
resaleability parameter  of equity and on the borrowing parameter .  is the fraction
of total equity that can be resold in a period, or the fraction of 'unmortgaged' capital
that can be issued.  is the fraction an entrepreneur can pledge of his future returns
to investment, i.e. the higher , the higher his option of outside nancing. Kiyotaki
and Moore show that, if  and  are suciently low, stocks are only partially liquid
and money is needed as a store of value that can quickly be liquidated and exchanged
for goods.
The economy is populated by entrepreneurs and workers, each with unit measure.
Entrepreneurs own the capital necessary for production, they can issue and trade
equity, hold money and randomly have the opportunity to invest. Workers spend
their labor income entirely on consumption goods. The government acts behind the
scenes: At the very beginning, it transfers money to individuals. The amount of
money remains xed and the government does not appear again.
At date t, entrepreneurs maximize expected discounted utility
Et
1X
s=t
s tu(cs) (1)
of consumption path fct; ct+1; ct+2; :::g, where u(c) = log c and 0 <  < 1. All
entrepreneurs produce output yt with the same technology
yt = Atk

t l
1 
t (2)
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with start-of-period capital stock kt and labor lt. 0 <  < 1 is the capital share in
production, and productivity At > 0 follows a stationary stochastic process. During
period t, capital depreciates to the end-of-period value kt, with 0 <  < 1
4. Pro-
duced goods minus labor compensation wtlt give the entrepreneur's prot, which is
proportional to the capital stock:
rtkt = yt   wtlt: (3)
With probability , the entrepreneur has access to an investment technology that
produces it units of capital from it units of output. Investment of period t enters in
production at the beginning of period t+ 1:5
kt+1 = kt + it: (4)
The investing entrepreneur faces a borrowing limit. He can pledge at most an exoge-
nously given fraction  < 1 of his investment. Exchanging equity against goods needs
more time than exchanging money against goods because the quality of equity has to
be veried. Equivalently, a fraction  < 1 of equity holdings is resaleable or a fraction
of new equity can be issued. To raise funds, an investor will therefore rst spend his
money and then sell as much of his equity holdings as possible. Both parameters 
and  are exogenous. Equity comprises inside and outside equity. Inside equity is
'unmortgaged' own capital. Outside equity is equity already traded in the market.
Total equity equals total capital.
An entrepreneur with equity nt and money mt at start of period t faces two 'liquidity
constraints'
nt+1  (1  )it + (1  t)nt (5)
mt+1  0: (6)
4They choose  <  to make the distribution of capital and asset holdings of individual en-
trepreneurs well-behaved.
5Entrepreneurs cannot insure against not having an investment opportunity.
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An investing entrepreneur nances at least (1 ) of the investment by himself and at
most it by issuing equity. He can sell at most t of his existing equity holdings nt.
According to (5), his equity at the start of t+ 1 is at least the capital resulting from
the inside nancing of investment plus the non-resaleable equity holdings. According
to (6), money holdings cannot be negative.
Fiat money has no a priori intrinsic value. This is why the authors use goods as
numeraire. They dene the price of money pt in terms of goods.
6 The value of money
becomes positive if  and  are suciently low. The price of equity in terms of goods,
qt, is also equal to Tobin's q: the market value relative to the replacement cost of
capital. The entrepreneurs' ow of funds constraint at time t in terms of goods is
ct + it + qt(nt+1   it   nt) + pt(mt+1  mt) = rtnt: (7)
Expenditures on consumption, investment, and net purchases of equity and money
equal dividend income in t. At date t, workers have utility
Et
1X
s=t
s tU

c0s  
!
1 + 
(l0s)
1+

(8)
with ! > 0,  > 0 and U [] increasing and strictly concave, and consumption paths
fc0t; c0t+1; c0t+2; :::g and labor supply paths fl0t; l0t; l0t; :::g. The ow-of-funds constraint of
a worker is
c0t + qt(n
0
t+1   n0t) + pt(m0t+1  m0t) = wtl0t + rtn0t: (9)
Consumption expenditures and net purchases of equity and money equal wage plus
dividend income. Workers have neither investment nor borrowing opportunities:
n0t+1  0 and m0t+1  0: (10)
6The literature usually denes prices of goods in terms of money (=how much money is one good).
Kiyotaki and Moore use goods as numeraire and dene pt as the reciprocal of the usual denition,
i.e. the price of money in terms of goods (=how many goods are one Euro).
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Utility maximization of the worker with unit measure subject to (9) and (10) gives an
aggregate labor supply of
 
wt
!
1=
. Labor market equilibrium implies an equilibrium
wage according to wt
!
1=
= Kt [(1  )At=wt]1= : (11)
The labor market equilibrium wage gives prots rtkt of entrepreneurs with
rt = at(Kt)
 1; (12)
where at and  are a combination of At, , ! and , 0 <  < 1.
In the neighborhood of the steady state, a worker demands neither equity nor money.
His optimization implies that he consumes his labor income in each period
c0t = wtl
0
t: (13)
The equilibrium for the entrepreneurs can be analyzed separately.
For suciently low values for  and t, money has a value pt > 0, the liquidity
constraints (5) and (6) are binding for an investing entrepreneur, and his ow of funds
constraint (7) becomes
cit + (1  qt)it = (rt + tqt)nt + ptmt: (14)
A fraction  of entrepreneurs randomly has access to an investment technology, which
transforms goods into the same number of capital units. Resources for investment
in t result from prots rtkt in terms of goods, money holdings mt that buy ptmt
goods, and equity nt of which an investing entrepreneur can exchange a fraction
t against tqtnt goods. The equity of an entrepreneur consists of 'unmortgaged
capital' and equity holdings. Issuing equity on unmortgaged capital is equivalent to
reselling existing equity holdings. Furthermore, he can issue  per unit of investment
as equity to acquire qt goods. The necessary downpayment for investment is (1  )
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in terms of capital, or (1  qt) in terms of goods. The investing entrepreneur uses all
his resources available after consumption for the inside nancing of investment, thus
the inside nancing of investment equals his resources available after consumption:
(1  qt)it = (rt + tqt)nt + ptmt   cit (15)
which gives investment as
it =
(rt + tqt)nt + ptmt   cit
1  qt : (16)
Available resources can be leveraged by a factor 11 qt to increase the scope for in-
vestment. Rephrasing Equation (14), the ow of funds constraint for the investing
entrepreneur nally becomes
cit + q
R
t n
i
t+1 = rtnt +

tqt + (1  t)qRt

nt + ptmt (17)
with qRt  1 qt1  < 1 as qt > 1: qRt represents the nancing costs of inside equity, which
is not traded in the market, in terms of goods. To acquire one unit of inside equity,
the investing entrepreneur needs 1 qt1  units of goods.
The investing entrepreneur retains the fraction  of his net worth, and consumes a
fraction 1  :
cit = (1  )

rtnt +

tqt + (1  t)qRt

nt + ptmt
	
(18)
nit+1 = 

rtnt +

tqt + (1  t)qRt

nt + ptmt
	
(19)
mit+1 = 0 (20)
For the non-investing entrepreneur, the ow of funds constraint reduces to
cst + qtn
s
t+1 + ptm
s
t+1 = rtnt + qtnt + ptmt (21)
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Consumption of the saving entrepreneur is 1   of his net worth:
cst = (1  ) [(rt + qt)nt + ptmt] (22)
His equity and money holdings in terms of goods make up for  times his net worth,
while the choice between equity and money is reected in ft, the share of equity in
the portfolio of the saving entrepreneur.
nst+1 =

qt
ft[(rt + qt)nt + ptmt] (23)
mst+1 =

pt
(1  ft)[(rt + qt)nt + ptmt] (24)
To determine his optimal portfolio between equity and money, the saving entrepreneur
can choose between sacricing one unit of consumption in t and purchasing 1=pt units
of money or 1=qt units of equity to increase consumption in t + 1. The rst order
condition is
u0(cst ) = Et

pt+1
pt
[(1  )u0(cst+1) + u0(cit+1)]

(25)
= (1  )Et

rt+1 + qt+1
qt
u0(cst+1)

+ Et
(
rt+1 + t+1qt+1 + (1  t+1)qRt+1
qt
u0(cit+1)
)
:
If the saving entrepreneur sacrices one unit of goods to purchase 1=pt units of money
this period, he can use this money to buy pt+1 units of goods in the next period.
Without investment opportunities in t+1, buying 1=qt units of equity gives a dividend
return plus the market price of the remaining capital next period. If an investment
opportunity arises in t+1 with probability , the return to equity is modied in that
the non-saleable fraction of equity is valued at its eective replacement cost qRt+1.
In the aggregate monetary economy, aggregate investment from (16) is
(1  qt)It = 

[(rt + tqt)Kt + ptM ]  (1  )(1  t)qRt Kt
	
: (26)
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Aggregate supply and demand for the entrepreneurs' goods market becomes with (18)
and (22)
rtKt = atK

t = It + Ct = It + (1  ) (27)
[rt + (1   + t)qt + (1  t)qRt ]Kt + ptM
	
(28)
For the aggregate portfolio decision between equity and money, it remains to more
closely consider the decision of saving entrepreneurs. The stock of equity saving
entrepreneurs hold at the end of the period is It + tKt + (1   )Kt  N st+1.
Investing entrepreneurs issue It as new equity, which is demanded by the saving
entrepreneurs. They further demand the equity holdings that investing entrepreneurs
sell and they keep their previous period's equity holdings.
The portfolio choice (N st+1;M) of non-investing entrepreneurs in (25) concretizes to
(1  )Et

(rt+1 + qt+1)=qt   pt+1=pt
(rt+1 + qt+1)N st+1 + pt+1M

(29)
= Et
"
pt+1=pt   [rt+1 + t+1qt+1 + (1  t+1)qRt+1]=qt
[rt+1 + t+1qt+1 + (1  t+1)qRt+1]N st+1 + pt+1M
#
Kiyotaki and Moore show that the expected return on equity Et
rt+1+qt+1
qt
, if the
entrepreneur is a saver in t + 1, will be higher than the expected return on money
Et
pt+1
pt
. If he has an investment opportunity, the expected eective rate of return on
equity, Et
rt+1+t+1qt+1+(1 t+1)qRt+1
qt
, will be lower than the return on money. The
optimal portfolio balances these return dierentials, weighted with the probabilities
for investment and marginal utilities, which are the reciprocals of consumptions for
logarithmic utility.
The only endogenous state variable in this system is Kt, which evolves according to
Kt+1 = Kt + It: (30)
Exogenous state variables are the parameters for liquidity t and technology At, which
follow an exogenous stationary Markov process, and the xed amount of money M .
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The equilibrium can be solved recursively as a function (It; pt; qt;Kt+1) of the aggre-
gate state variables (Kt; At; t) that satises (12) and (26) to (30), as well as the law
of motions of At and t.
Kiyotaki and Moore model a rich set of interest rates. These are in descending order
the expected marginal product of capital, the time preference rate, the expected return
on equity, the expected return on money and the expected rate of return on equity
contingent on the saver having an investment opportunity in the next period. The
fact that the expected rates of return on equity and money are lower than the time
preference rate imply that savings of entrepreneurs rest at a level which makes them
liquidity constrained in case of future investment opportunities. It also explains that
borrowing-constrained workers do not save.
These interest rates imply a nominal return on equity. According to the Fisher equa-
tion, the nominal return on equity equals the real return on equity plus the expected
ination rate. In terms of the notation of Kiyotaki and Moore, this amounts to sub-
tracting the expected return on money from the real return on equity.
In the Kiyotaki-Moore-framework presented, a helicopter drop of additional money
proportionately reduces the price of money. Real money holdings Lt = ptMt stay
constant. Real aggregate quantities remain the same.
3 Debt-money in the Kiyotaki-Moore economy
Kiyotaki and Moore model money in its pure form: the government produces and gives
money to individuals. The resulting equilibrium represents the benchmark economy
with pure money.
In the following, I will introduce the debt-side of money into the Kiyotaki-Moore
economy. In line with their model, the government gives money to individuals. In
addition, a bank produces money against interest-bearing debt.
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The government in the model subsumes all non-banks that borrow money from banks
in reality. One single bank in the model represents the banking sector including the
central bank in reality. Today's central banks issue central bank money, i.e. reserves
and cash, against interest bearing debt. Commercial and central banks both create
debt-money according to the same principles.
3.1 Exponentially growing money and debt volumes
Consider a Kiyotaki-Moore economy with scope for money, while money does not
yet exist. The government perceives that money would improve the allocation of
resources. To increase aggregate welfare, it aims at providing an amount of money M
to the economy. A banker appears and persuades the government of the following deal:
The bank will print paper notes that the government will institutionalize as money.
The government will sign a perpetual debt obligation in return for receiving the money.
Each year, the government will pay a xed interest rate iD on the outstanding debt.
Debt-money has been initiated.
Note that for money to have a value in an economy, several conditions have to be met.
First, in the Kiyotaki-Moore setup, no other asset is perfectly liquid and investing
entrepreneurs are nancing constrained. Second, more generally speaking, people
have to acknowledge something as money. The people in an economy legitimate and
use money. They elect a government, which institutionalizes money by law. Third,
money has to exist. While people create the idea of money, the bank materializes
money by printing. Consequently, the people, represented by the government, have
the highest position in the hierarchy, the bank should have a subordinate role. The
function of the bank should be to carry out the orders of the government.
By making the above described debt-money deal with the government, the bank has
reversed the hierarchy. It has become the creditor to the government and has gained
the most powerful position. Its immense prots are in no relation to its veritable
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function of printing paper notes. The government has lost by accepting the role
of a perpetual debtor. In the end, the people will have lost in every possible way:
First, their government is indebted. Second, the bank owner will have deprived the
entrepreneurs of all of their capital. Third, seeing huge accumulated debt obligations
on the asset side of the bank's balance sheet, people fear that the bank operates
at high risk. They fear a break-down of the bank, associated with a fear that the
monetary system and consequently the economy will collapse. Not knowing the true
mechanisms, they will blame the government for lax debt policy. Both, the government
and the people, do not perceive the true underlying mechanism in all consequences.
The bank veils the true mechanism and deliberately prots from it.
Consider the following setup to see the implications of the banker's deal on debt and
money volumes. At the end of period t = 0, the government receives an amount M of
the bank and immediately transfers M to the entrepreneurs. Aggregate money at the
beginning of t = 1 is thus M1 = M , and the government owes D1 = D = M to the
bank. At the end of period t = 1, interest rate payments iD1 = iD are due. Since,
obviously, the government has no money left and cannot print it, it has to borrow
iDD1 = i
DD from the bank. The government receives money iDM and immediately
returns iDM to the bank to pay the due interest.7 Accumulated government debt at
the start of t = 2 increases to D2 = (1 + i
D)D.
The interest rate payments of the government represent monetary seigniorage prot
for the bank. I assume that the bank hands prots over to the bank owner, analogous
to issuing dividends to a shareholder. End-of-period t = 1 seigniorage prots are
available for spending for the banker in t = 2: M bk2 = i
DM1 = i
DM . The aggregate
amount of money in the economy in t = 2 equals the initial amount of money plus
money spent by the banker: M2 =M1 + i
DM1 = (1 + i
D)M .
7In reality, an individual or the government borrows new money, spends it, and someone else uses
it to pay due interests.
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At the end of t = 2, the government has to pay due interest iDD2 = i
D(1+ iD)D and
again has to borrow the amount from the bank. Bank seigniorage prots disposable
in t = 3 are M bk3 = i
DM2 = i
D(1 + iD)M , such that aggregate money becomes
M3 =M2 + i
DM2 = (1 + i
D)2M .
For t  2, outstanding nominal debt Dt = (1 + iD)t 1D can be rewritten as Dt =
D+iDD
Pt 2
k=0(1+i
D)k. The more the economy advances in time, the smaller becomes
the initial amount D relative to the accumulated debt Dt and the larger becomes the
nominal interest rate burden iDD
Pt 2
k=0(1 + i
D)k. Interest rate payments made by
the government result in accumulated seigniorage prot iDM
Pt 2
k=0(1 + i
D)k for the
banker. Table 2 illustrates the process in the bank's balance sheet.
Debt-money induces exponentially growing volumes of debt, of aggregate money and
of the banker's nominal assets. Hannigan (1971) was the rst one to point to these
implications of debt-money.8
Figure 1 illustrates the evolution of debt and money for an interest rate of iD = 0:008
per quarter and an initial amount of money M = 10.9 Following the balance sheet
logic in Table 2, debt and money volumes evolve identically. Both grow exponentially
with rate iD per period. The more time advances, the more both variables increase
until they get excessively high compared to the initial amount of money. The same
is true for the banker's prot represented by the distance between money volume Mt
and the initial amount of moneyM . Figure 1 extrapolates the balance sheet identities
for an exemplarily chosen number of t = 300 periods.
8See also Ms. Victoria Grant for a clear and simple exposition of debt-money on
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G16WYdmkGRo.
9I set iD equal to the steady-state real return on equity in the Kiyotaki-Moore model.
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Table 2: Bank balance sheet with debt-money
Assets Bank Liabilities
t = 0, end
Initial debt +D Initial money +M
t = 1
Accumulated debt D1 = D Aggregate money M1 =M
t = 1, end
New debt +iDD New bank prot +iDM
t = 2
Accumulated debt D2 = (1 + i
D)D Aggregate money M2 = (1 + i
D)M
t = 2, end
New debt +iD(1 + iD)D New bank prot +iD(1 + iD)M
t = 3
Accumulated debt D3 = (1 + i
D)2D Aggregate money M3 = (1 + i
D)2M
t = 3, end
New debt +iD(1 + iD)2D New bank prot +iD(1 + iD)2M
. . . .
. . . .
. . . .
t = j
Accumulated debt Dj = (1 + i
D)j 1D Aggregate money Mj = (1 + iD)j 1M
t = j, end
New debt +iD(1 + iD)j 1D New bank prot +iD(1 + iD)j 1M
t = j + 1
Accumulated debt Dj+1 = (1 + i
D)jD Aggregate money Mj+1 = (1 + i
D)jM
. . . .
. . . .
. . . .
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Figure 1: Exponentially growing money and debt volumes in a debt-money economy
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Notes: Solid black line: Exponentially growing volumes of debt Dt and money Mt. Dashed blue
line: Initial volumes of debt D and money M . Distance between black and blue line: Seigniorage
prot of the banker. All variables in terms of money.
3.2 Banker buys world
This section embeds debt-money into the Kiyotaki-Moore model presented in Section
2. The banker is the new economic agent to enter the scene. His counterparty, the
government, has transferred the initial amount of money M to entrepreneurs, and
does not interfere further with the equilibrium of the economy. Behind the scenes, it
is involved in the debt-money creation spiral with the bank according to Section 3.1.
Debt-money rst implies exponentially growing volumes of nominal debt and money.
Since prices are fully exible, they adjust proportionally to keep real money balances
constant. Money and debt in real terms stay at their initial levels. We do not observe
any changes in aggregate, real steady state values if money or debt volumes increase.
Second, the bank makes seigniorage prots. Even if prices of goods in terms of money
increase, the banker's prots in real terms are positive. The banker uses these seignior-
age prots to buy the world.
In the Kiyotaki-Moore economy, workers are conned to consuming their labor income.
The central action takes place among the entrepreneurs. This setup reects the central
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position of the entrepreneurs as wheel of the economy: they own the capital and have
the specic knowledge of how to use it in a productive way, see also Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997) for this thought. When introducing a banker, I will therefore focus on
his interactions with the entrepreneurs.
I assume that entrepreneurs do not fully understand the underlying economic model
because the deal between the banker and the government is opaque for them. They
only have a fragmented view on the banker's strategy, in particular his sources of
prot. They optimize with the Kiyotaki-Moore model in mind. They regard the bank
as a nancial intermediary and adviser. They cannot form systematically correct
expectations neither about the future wealth distribution nor about the evolution of
money. In particular, they assume that the amount of money will remain constant.
During the course of a period, entrepreneurs are surprised by actual changes in money
ows and realize that their prot situation deteriorates more and more. They live
according to the principle of hope: They hope that things will get better again, i.e.
that they can live again in the Kiyotaki-Moore economy with pure money. The bank,
in contrast, has full understanding of the behavior of non-banks, veils its own strategy
and prots from the asymmetry of knowledge.
Regarding the interplay among entrepreneurs in the Kiyotaki-Moore model, a fraction
 of entrepreneurs randomly has access to an investment technology that transforms
goods into capital. To nance the desired level of investment, investing entrepreneurs
issue new equity, and sell equity and money holdings. While the resaleability of equity
is restricted to a fraction , they can spend all their money holdings in exchange for
goods. At the end of a period, non-investing entrepreneurs have demanded all money
available to be liquid for future investment opportunities.
Two circumstances favor the bank in the economic processes. First, there are many
heterogenous entrepreneurs while the bank is one institution known for giving out
money and for assisting in nancial services. An entrepreneur perceives the bank
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as a central trading partner, who is more convenient to deal with compared to the
costly search for an adequate trading partner among the entrepreneurs. In seeking
nancing, he directly goes to the bank. Second, the bank is the only agent with full
understanding of the economic model. Only the bank knows that it will inject more
money and that prices will adjust. It is thus the rst agent willing to pay more money
in exchange for goods. Both circumstances imply that the banker is served rst.
Aggregate money in the debt-money economy in t is Mt = M
ep
t + M
bk
t = Mt 1 +
iDMt 1. At the start of period t, the entrepreneurs can dispose of their money holdings
saved in t 1: M ept =Mt 1. During period t, the banker spends his seigniorage prots
M bkt = i
DMt 1 in exchange for ptM bkt goods. The entrepreneurs will start the next
period t+ 1 with money holdings M ept+1 =Mt.
In t, the banker applies the same utility maximization as entrepreneurs
Et
1X
s=t
s tu(Cbks ) (31)
of consumption path fCbkt ; Cbkt+1; Cbkt+2; :::g, where u(Cbk) = logCbk and 0 <  < 1.
In distinction to the entrepreneurs, the banker does not save in form of money because
each period, he prints new money. It is helpful to consider the starting periods of the
economy for his accumulation of wealth.
The economy starts in t = 1 with M1 = M . The banker is not yet active in the
markets, because he has not yet made any seigniorage prots. The equilibrium in
t = 1 corresponds to the equilibrium in the Kiyotaki-Moore model with aggregate real
balances p1M1.
At the end of t = 1, the banker makes seigniorage prots iDM1, which become eective
for spending at the beginning of t = 2: M bk2 = i
DM1. The banker is the rst one to
buy goods at the very beginning of t = 2 at price p2 < p1. Of p2M
bk
2 goods, he uses
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(1  ) for consumption:
Cbk2 = (1  )p2M bk2 (32)
The banker now disposes of p2M
bk
2 remaining goods. For the acquisition of equity,
he can buy equity from investing entrepreneurs at the market price qt. If he manages
to get involved in the internal nancing of investing entrepreneurs, he can acquire
equity at the lower, internal price qRt < qt.
To nance investment, the  investing entrepreneurs sell equity holdings and issue
new equity to the banker and the saving entrepreneurs. They also sell their money
holdings to the saving entrepreneurs in exchange for goods, which they transform into
capital goods10
N ep;i3 =

qR2


r2 + 2q2 + (1  2)qR2

N2 + p2M
ep
2
	
: (33)
The investing entrepreneurs realize that the transactions brought them less goods
compared to t = 1 resulting from lower real balances p2M
ep
2 = p2M1 < p1M1. The
banker having foreseen this, has put aside p2M
bk
2 of the goods he had bought at the
beginning of the period. He oers these goods to the investing entrepreneurs under
the condition that he will get the equivalence in terms of inside equity. His 'internally
nanced' equity is then
N bk;if3 =

qR2
p2M
bk
2 : (34)
With equity from trading in the market
N bk;tr3 =

q2
(1  )p2M bk2 ; (35)
total equity of the banker adds up to N bk3 = N
bk;if
3 +N
bk;tr
3 .
10When the banker has spent his money on goods, money in the hands of entrepreneurs increases
to M2 = M
ep
2 +M
bk
2 . Their goods produced, r2N2, reduce by p2M
bk
2 , and their money holdings in
real terms increase by p2M
bk
2 , with a net eect of zero on net worth.
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The (1   ) saving entrepreneurs demand the equity left over by the bank and the
money holdings of the investing entrepreneurs. At the end of a period, all money is
held by the saving entrepreneurs: M ep3 = M2. Their equity holdings reduce relative
to the Kiyotaki-Moore economy to
N ep;s3 =
1
q2
f(1  ) [(r2 + q2)N2 + p2M ep2 ]  p2M ep3 g : (36)
Total equity holdings of entrepreneurs diminish to N ep3 = N3  N bk3 .
At the beginning of t = 3, investment opportunities arise again randomly for  en-
trepreneurs. Investing entrepreneurs now have not only less real balances, but also
less own equity for the inside nancing of investments. The bank's oers to also ll the
equity gap under the condition that it is treated in ownership and return for his part
of nancing like the investing entrepreneur. An investing entrepreneur wants to invest
as much as possible, even if he then will only be the manager instead of the owner of
the newly created capital. He accepts the nancial assistance of the bank. With the
banker buying more and more equity, the entrepreneur will gradually become a mere
manager of production.
The bank's 'internal nancing' department accumulates equity according to the same
principles as the investing entrepreneur
N bk;if4 =

qR3

n
r3 + 3q3 + (1  3)qR3

N bk3 + p3M
bk
3
o
: (37)
The bank's 'trade' department buys equity and accumulates equity holdings
N bk;tr4 =

q3
(1  )
h
(r3 + q3)N
bk
3 + p3M
bk
3
i
: (38)
Total equity holdings of the bank add up to N bk4 = N
bk;if
4 +N
bk;tr
4 . Consumption of
the banker is
Cbk3 = (1  )
n
r3 + (1   + 3)q3 + (1  3)qR3

N bk3 + p3M
bk
3
o
: (39)
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Generalized for period t, the banker's choices lead to
Cbkt = (1  )
n
rt + (1   + t)qt + (1  t)qRt

N bkt + ptM
bk
t
o
; (40)
N bk;ift+1 =

qRt

n
rt + tqt + (1  t)qRt

N bkt + ptM
bk
t
o
: (41)
N bk;trt+1 =

qt
(1  )
h
(rt + qt)N
bk
t + ptM
bk
t
i
; (42)
and
N bkt+1 = N
bk;if
t+1 +N
bk;tr
t+1 : (43)
Equity of all investing entrepreneurs evolves according to
N ep;it+1 =

qRt

n
rt + tqt + (1  t)qRt

(Nt  N bkt ) + ptM ept
o
: (44)
and of saving entrepreneurs
N ep;st+1 =
1
qt
n
(1  )
h
(rt + qt)(Nt  N bkt ) + ptM ept
i
  ptM ept+1
o
; (45)
with M ept+1 =M
ep
t +M
bk
t = (1 + i
D)Mt.
Equity and consumption of all entrepreneurs reduces to
N ept+1 = Nt+1  N bkt+1 (46)
and
Cept = (1  )
n
rt + (1   + t)qt + (1  t)qRt

(Nt  N bkt ) + ptM ept
o
: (47)
Consider now the equilibrium conditions in the economy with the banker. Although
moneyMt and prices pt vary, real total balances Lt = ptMt are of the same value as in
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the Kiyotaki-Moore economy. Since the banker mimics the behavior of entrepreneurs
in trading and investment, aggregate investment remains the same as in (26):
(1  qt)It =  [(rt + qtt)Kt + ptMt]  (1  )(1  t)qRt Kt (48)
The banker's demand for consumption adds to the goods market clearing condition
(28)
rtKt = It + C
bk
t + C
ep
t : (49)
The portfolio equation (29) describes the allocation of equity and money and their
expected returns from the point of view of those who demand these assets t. In
(50), equity is demanded by the trading department of the bank and saving en-
trepreneurs, money as end-of-period savings are demanded by saving entrepreneurs.
Investing entrepreneurs and the internal nancing department of the bank oer eq-
uity. They issue new equity on investment It and sell existing equity holdings
t(N
ep;i
t +N
bk;if
t ) = t(N
ep
t +N
bk
t ) = tNt.
From the previous period, saving entrepreneurs and the bank's trading department
own equity (1   )(N ept + N bkt ) = (1   )Nt. Thus, total equity by non-investing
economic agents N st+1 = N
ep;s
t+1 +N
bk;tr
t+1 = It+tNt+(1 )Nt equals the N st+1 in
(29). The return to money holdings is relevant for the end-of-period money holders,
i.e. the saving entrepreneurs. From their perspective, c.p. Et[pt+1] = pt because in t,
they expect money to stay constant in t + 1. In consequence, the portfolio equation
(50) is equivalent to (29):
(1  )Et

(rt+1 + qt+1)=qt   pt+1=pt
(rt+1 + qt+1)N st+1 + pt+1M
ep
t+1

(50)
= Et
"
pt+1=pt   [rt+1 + t+1qt+1 + (1  t+1)qRt+1]=qt
[rt+1 + t+1qt+1 + (1  t+1)qRt+1]N st+1 + pt+1M ept+1
#
:
Of course, the composition of assets between banks and saving entrepreneurs changes
according to the principle, that the bank buys equity rst at the price qt in line with
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(50). The ownership rights of aggregate capital change:
Kt+1 = N
ep
t+1 +N
bk
t+1: (51)
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the evolution of variables in absolute and relative terms. Fig-
ure 2 rst shows that the Kiyotaki-Moore economy with pure money attains a stable
long-run steady state (blue dashed line). The entrepreneurs produce with a constant
capital stock that generates constant output and consumption. The aggregate steady
state values of the Kiyotaki-Moore built the outer frame for the debt-money economy,
which exhibits strong redistribution within. As soon as the banker and his inven-
tion of debt-money are introduced, the banker gradually buys the capital stock of the
economy. In period 1058, he has taken possession of all capital. In consequence, the
entrepreneurs' returns to capital are zero, they have no more means for consumption
goods.11 They die and with them dies the knowledge of how to productively use
capital. The economy breaks down.12
11According to the modeling strategy, the entrepreneurs end up with positive money holdings. At
this point of time, they are in fact worthless, because the banker does not demand money.
12Note that the banker's maximization strategy assumed an innite horizon. When maximizing,
the banker is not aware of the fact that also he depends on others. Finally, owning the world is not
protable if the world breaks down.
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Figure 2: Real wealth and consumption under debt-money in comparison to pure
money
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Notes: Solid black line: Evolution of variables in the debt-money economy. Blue dashed line:
Aggregate steady-state variables for entrepreneurs in the Kiyotaki-Moore-pure-money model.
Variables in terms of goods. Vertical red line: Break-down of the economy.
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Figure 3: Wealth and consumption shares in the debt-money economy
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Notes: All variables relative to aggregate steady-state variables in the Kiyotaki-Moore-pure-money
model, which represent total capital and maximal consumption. Vertical red line: Break-down of the
economy.
3.3 The historical evolution of debt-money
In earlier times as in the Roman Empire, minting coins was the privilege of the feudal
seigneurs. Banks received coins from the rich and lent it to third parties against
interest. They were true nancial intermediaries.
By the end of the 16th and in the 17th century, modern banking emerged in London.
At that time, wealthy merchants were storing their gold with the goldsmiths. The
goldsmiths issued certicates that attested the ownership of the gold stored. Each
merchant could at any time withdraw his gold in stored in vault. These certicates,
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or deposit notes, rst could not be assigned to a third person. Gradually, the character
of these individual certicates changed. The goldsmiths started to issue promissory
notes. Everyone could now use the promissory note as a claim to the gold in storage.
Paper money was fully backed by gold.
The goldsmiths discovered that people would never claim all the gold corresponding
to the paper notes in circulation. In fact, if people claimed all gold, there would be
no more paper notes in circulation. The goldsmiths realized that they could pyramid
their loans and their money issued on the gold stored, see Angell (1935). For the
pyramiding, the goldsmiths granted a loan and issued paper notes to a person in need
for money. These paper notes were a claim to a specied amount of gold supposed
to be stored with the goldsmiths. However, they actually held only a fraction of the
assumed amount of gold in their vault. This scheme is most striking if we imagine a
fraction of zero gold backing: The goldsmiths would print notes and lend them. This
transaction has the character of a loan, thus the goldsmiths would claim it back plus
interest. Modern banking was established, where banks created loans and deposits
virtually out of nothing. Notably, they also created own prots out of nothing: The
new scheme promised immense prots to the banks from interest rates they claimed
for self-made money and that made in turn new interest bearing money creation
necessary.13 One banker family whose lineage can be traced back to their origins as
goldsmiths in London is the Rothschild family.14
13For the outsider, it is hardly possible to distinguish whether a bank grants a loan and has received
savings before (this is nancial intermediation, corresponding to full gold backing in this early context)
or whether the bank creates the loan and the money simultaneously out of nothing.
14See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_banking.
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4 Pure money
Money serves as means of payment, as numeraire and as an asset. Today's monetary
system creates an environment of debt and inequality.
In a new system, money will continue to full its functions. The environment created
by pure money will be dierent. Pure money will provide a basis on which we can
build a prospering, stable and equilibrated economy.
Pure money already exists in macroeconomic models. It is money dropped by he-
licopters to non-banks. Macroeconomic models model money as it should be: The
government gives it as a transfer, a present to people, to lubricate the economy.
Macroeconomic models do not correspond to reality where money and debt creation
are two sides of one coin. The point is to adapt money creation in reality to macroe-
conomic models.
In a translation of pure money of macroeconomic models to reality, the government
creates money by giving monetary transfers to individuals. The decision about the
optimal amount of money can be delegated to an independent central bank that
calculates the optimal amount of money in line with price stability. Commercial
banks transfer the resulting individual lump-sum amounts to the current accounts
of people. The government adequately recompenses banks for their money creation
services.
From an accounting perspective, the aim is to nd an appropriate counterpart position
for money. This counterpart position guarantees that the money will be in the economy
for disposition.
Since people create the idea of money out of their own authority, the counterpart
position of money should represent their own authority, their own capital, i.e. eq-
uity. Equity represents the economy, its people and their potential. It symbolizes
the engagement of everyone. It is not tradable. It amounts in value to the money in
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circulation.
In the Kiyotaki-Moore economy, equity-based money M and the newly created equity
position NM would appear in the balance sheet of a bank as presented in Table 3.
Table 3: Bank balance sheet with equity-based money
Assets Bank Liabilities
Equity NM Money M
The idea of equity-based money was rst raised by proponents of the Chicago plan after
the Great Depression, see Douglas, Fisher, Graham, Hamilton, King, and Whittlesey
(1939), the most popular among them being Irving Fisher, see Fisher (1935). Recently,
Benes and Kumhof (2012) rened the idea and simulated the US-economy under
the Chicago Plan in a state-of-the-art DSGE model. They show that the economy
will prot considerably from an equity-based money creation. Existing debt will be
replaced by equity according to well-dened criteria. In consequence, debt of non-
banks will be substantially reduced. Business cycles will be alleviated compared to
the current system. They also design details for a transition period and simulate the
transition path of the US-economy from the old to the new system.
5 Conclusion and Outlook
In today's monetary system, money can only be created simultaneously with debt.
Although money fulls its functions, the debt-side of money leads to an unfavorable
economic environment: It implies increasing volumes of money and debt, and eco-
nomic inequality. The economic system is made unstable: It needs demand for loans
to generate new money. If the economy lacks demand for loans, it also lacks the
money to make interest rate payments for outstanding loans, and bankruptcies are
the likely consequence. The debt-side of money further leads to the illusion that we
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need economic growth to service our debt. Seeing these drawbacks of debt-money, I
motivate a new monetary system with pure money.
Pure money fulls the functions of money. By being available as fully liquid asset and
as means of payment, it fosters a sound environment and represents a stable basis for
an economy to be in equilibrium, to prosper and to be free to grow. In accounting,
the counterpart position of money becomes non-tradable equity. The value of equity
reects the potential of the economy and its inhabitants. With equity as counterpart
position, money receives the character of an endowment for individuals.
The idea of equity-based money was raised by proponents of the Chicago Plan after
the Great Depression and was recently rened by Benes and Kumhof (2012). Benes
and Kumhof detail the transition to equity-based money for the U.S. and present a
coherent framework for its implementation.
I conclude that it is most pressing to renew the monetary system and restart the
economy with equity-based money. A well-functioning monetary system will make it
easer for governments to tackle further reforms, too.
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